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To What Extent Does Productivity Drive the Dollar?
Cédric Tille, Nicolas Stoffels, and Olga Gorbachev
The continuing strength of the dollar has fueled interest in the relationship between productivity
and exchange rates. An analysis of the link between the dollar’s movements and productivity
developments in the United States, Japan, and the euro area suggests that productivity can
account for much of the change in the external value of the dollar over the past three decades.
As U.S. labor productivity surged in the second half of the
1990s, the dollar was charting its own upward course
against the currencies of the United States’ chief trading
partners. Between 1995 and 1999, the dollar appreciated
4.8 percent against the yen and 5.8 percent against the
euro on an average annual basis.1 For some observers, the
productivity boom and the dollar’s rise were twin mani-
festations of U.S. economic strength.2 Indeed, the parallel
timing of these trends suggested that productivity gains
were driving the appreciation of the dollar.
In this edition of Current Issues, we use new data from
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) to analyze more precisely how productivity
gains have affected the value of the dollar. After clarifying
the theoretical link between the two, we create measures
of productivity based on a simple standard framework for
the United States, Japan, and the euro area. We then show
that these measures do a reasonably good job of explain-
ing the dollar’s long cycles over the last three decades.
Most notably, we are able to establish that productivity
developments accounted for nearly two-thirds of the 
dollar’s appreciation against the euro and three-quarters
of its appreciation against the yen in the 1990s.
How Productivity Growth and Currency Value Are Linked
The Real Exchange Rate
We begin our investigation of the relationship between
productivity gains and the strong dollar with a brief
look at how we measure the value of a currency. The
best gauge of this value is a currency’s real exchange
rate against a foreign currency. The real exchange
rate—defined as the nominal exchange rate adjusted for
the ratio of foreign prices to domestic prices3—allows
us to compare the purchasing power of different curren-
cies. For example, the real dollar-euro exchange rate
compares the quantity of goods that one dollar buys in
the United States with the quantity of goods that the
same dollar, converted into euros, buys in Europe.
Alternatively, one could say that the real exchange rate
allows us to compare the cost of a fixed basket of goods
in the United States and Europe. Thus, a real apprecia-
tion of the dollar—in other words, an increase in the
dollar-euro real exchange rate—means that the basket
of goods will be more expensive in the United States
than in Europe.
The Theory behind the Link
The impact of productivity gains on a currency’s value
depends on the distribution of the gains across the
“traded” and “nontraded” sectors of the economy. The
traded sector is composed of those industries, such as
manufacturing, that produce goods for export or goods
that compete with foreign imports. The nontraded sec-
tor consists of industries—chiefly services—that pro-
duce solely for domestic markets from which foreign
producers are absent. Price behavior differs markedly in
the two sectors. In the traded sector, the price of goods
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is constrained by international competition: companies
tend to keep their prices (in common-currency terms)
fairly closely aligned with those of producers abroad so
as not to lose customers to foreign rivals. By contrast, in
the nontraded sector, where industries are not subject to
competition,4 goods prices tend to vary widely and
independently across countries. 
Theoretical work by Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964),
and Samuelson (1964) has shown that productivity
growth will lead to a real exchange rate appreciation
only if it is concentrated in the traded sector of an econ-
omy. Productivity growth that has been equally strong
in the traded and nontraded sectors will have no effect
on the real exchange rate.
Box 1: A Simple Theoretical Framework
To understand how productivity may help determine real
exchange rates, consider a two-country world (the United
States and “Europe,” for example) where a single input,
labor, is used to produce both traded and nontraded goods.
Because our analysis focuses on the changes in productivity
and in the real exchange rate, we express all variables in
terms of growth rates. In addition, we express prices and
wages for both countries in a common currency (be it the
dollar, the euro, or some other currency).
The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson view of real exchange
rate determination is based on four basic principles:
1) The prices of traded goods produced in different coun-
tries tend to move together. As traded goods are
exchanged on a world market, the price of a good pro-
duced in the United States aligns itself with the price of
the same good produced in Europe. Formally:
where        is the growth rate of the price of traded goods
produced in country i.
2) The price of nontraded goods can differ across countries,
because the goods are not traded on the same market:
where        is the growth rate of the price of nontraded
goods produced in country i.
3) Competition for labor among firms leads workers to be
paid the (marginal) value of what they produce. When
workers become more productive, firms can afford to
pay higher wages. Similarly, an increase in wages that is
not accompanied by productivity gains leads firms to
pass the cost through to consumers in the form of higher
prices:
and
where        is the growth rate of the wage paid to workers
in sector k in country i, and               is the growth rate of
output per worker (that is, labor productivity).
4) Labor mobility within a country encourages consistency
in wages across sectors. For instance, rising wages in the
traded sector will boost wages in the nontraded sector
because firms want to prevent their employees from
leaving their jobs to work in the traded sector:
From these four principles,a we derive the exchange
rate implications of a productivity boom. Recall that
the real exchange rate is the ratio of the aggregate price
indexes, with both indexes expressed in the same unit:
where RER is the percentage change in the real exchange
rate, with an increase corresponding to a real apprecia-
tion; P i is the growth rate of the aggregate price index in
country i; and αi is the weight of nontraded goods in
country i’s price index. Combining principles 1-4 with
the above definition of the real exchange rate, we con-
struct the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) measure as
the percentage change in the real exchange rate caused by
the productivity gaps GAPUS and GAPEurope:
where is  the sectoral pro-
ductivity growth gap in country i.b
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a Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1999) and Chinn (1997) perform formal tests of these principles for OECD countries. Their results
provide broad support for the principles over long horizons.
b This relationship does not rely on the assumption that labor is the only factor of production; an identical relation between the real
exchange rate and output per worker is obtained in a model with capital.
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andThe reasoning behind the theory (presented in more
detail in Box 1) is most easily grasped through an
example. Suppose that the United States experiences
faster productivity growth in the traded sector than in
the nontraded sector, creating what we will call a posi-
tive sectoral productivity gap. The price of traded goods
in the United States will not change, because—as we
have seen—it is tied to that prevailing in world markets.
The productivity gains in the traded sector will, how-
ever, lead to higher wages for workers in these indus-
tries. Wages will also rise in the nontraded sector, as
employers there seek to retain their workers by offering
salaries competitive with those in the traded sector.
However, because the productivity gains, if any, in the
nontraded sector are smaller than those in the traded
sector, firms producing nontraded goods will be unable
to absorb the wage increase fully and will be compelled
to raise prices. With prices constant in the traded sector
and rising in the nontraded sector, the overall U.S. price
level will increase.5 Consequently, if the foreign price
level is unchanged, the rise in domestic prices will
translate into an appreciation of the dollar in real terms.
Using similar reasoning, we conclude that a negative
sectoral productivity gap—that is, slower productivity
growth in the traded sector than in the nontraded sec-
tor—leads to a real depreciation of the dollar.
Bear in mind, however, that the response to a produc-
tivity shock that we have outlined here can be expected
to operate only over relatively long horizons, such as
decades. It is very unlikely to work over short periods—
for example, from one year to the next—because of
slow price and wage adjustments, imperfect competi-
tion, trade barriers, and other frictions in the economy.
Nevertheless, this framework for understanding the
consequences of a productivity shock, though simple, is
a standard approach in the analysis of real exchange
rate fluctuations, and earlier economic studies have
shown that it is indeed relevant over long horizons.6
Our framework points to a measure of productivity
growth that can be used to assess the relationship between
productivity gains and exchange rate movements. The
measure—here termed the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson
(HBS) measure—is essentially the difference between the
productivity gap (traded-minus-nontraded productivity
growth) in the United States and the corresponding gap
abroad (see Box 1 for details). By tracking the changes in
the HBS measure over time, we can identify the changes
in the real exchange rate that can be directly attributed to
productivity gains. Thus, an increase of 10 percent in the
HBS measure indicates that the real exchange rate would
appreciate by 10 percent, assuming that productivity
growth is the only driving factor. In the next section, we
compute such a measure for the United States, Japan, and
the euro area.
Has Productivity Been an Important Determinant
of the Dollar Exchange Rate?
To address this question, we use labor productivity data
from the OECD covering the 1970-99 period (see Box 2
for a detailed description of the data). Following com-
mon practice in the literature, we break down the data
by sector as follows: The traded goods sector includes
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; mining and
quarrying; and manufacturing. The nontraded sector
includes all other principal industry divisions—elec-
tricity, gas, and water; construction; wholesale and
retail trade; restaurants and hotels; transport, storage,
and communication; finance, insurance, real estate, and
business services; and other services and government.
In computing the changes in productivity in each sector,
we disregard short-lived fluctuations and focus on
decade-long horizons over which the link between pro-
ductivity and the real exchange rates can be expected to
hold.
Sectoral Productivity Patterns
An examination of the sectoral productivity patterns in
the United States, Japan, and the euro area over the
thirty-year period reveals some interesting features
(Chart 1). First, since the productivity changes in the
traded and nontraded sectors tend to move in tandem,
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Box 2: Data Sources
We use annual sectoral productivity data from two
compatible OECD databases: ISDB (International
Sectoral DataBase) and STAN (STructural ANalysis
database). Because of the comparability of the two
archives, we are able to combine them to obtain con-
sistent series from 1970 to 1999 for the United
States, Japan, and four euro area countries: Germany,
Italy, France, and the Netherlands.a We compute pro-
ductivity as the ratio between value added (the value
of output minus the cost of intermediary goods, in
1990 dollars) and employment.
The real exchange rates are calculated using the
Bank for International Settlements’ exchange rate
series and the OECD’s GDP deflator indexes.b The
dollar-euro exchange rate is based on the four coun-
tries that we use to represent Europe. This exchange
rate tracks very closely an exchange rate based on
the twelve euro area countries.
aGermany, Italy, France, and the Netherlands account for
nearly 80 percent of euro area GDP.
bReal exchange rate measures change very little if we use
consumer price indexes instead of GDP deflators.the sectoral productivity gap is much less volatile than
the productivity growth rate for the traded sector.
Second, over the last thirty years, the sectoral productiv-
ity gap has increased substantially in the United States,
while it has remained rather steady in the euro area and has
fallen in Japan. In the United States (Chart 1, top panel),
this performance mostly reflects the acceleration of pro-
ductivity in the traded sector. However, it would be mis-
leading to focus solely on this sector. In the 1990s,
annual productivity growth in the traded sector
exceeded its rate in the 1980s by 1.4 percentage points.
Nevertheless, the increase in the sectoral gap from the
1980s to the 1990s was limited to 0.6 percentage point,
because productivity growth also picked up in the non-
traded sector.7
By contrast, Japan (Chart 1, middle panel) has expe-
rienced a steady decline in the sectoral productivity gap
from the 1970s to the 1990s. The main driving force has
been the slowdown of traded sector productivity from
its postwar highs: in the 1990s, productivity growth in
this sector was 3.7 percentage points lower than in the
1970s. Still, because the nontraded sector has also
experienced a productivity slowdown, the sectoral gap
has not fallen one-for-one with the decline in traded
sector productivity. In the 1990s, the sectoral gap was
1.5 percentage points below its value for the 1970s.
Europe’s sectoral productivity gap has remained
steady over the last three decades, hovering around
2 percent (Chart 1, bottom panel). This performance
reflects a uniform productivity slowdown in the traded
and nontraded sectors. For instance, in the 1980s,
annual productivity growth in the traded sector slowed
by 1 percentage point relative to the 1970s. However,
because the nontraded sector also experienced a signifi-
cant productivity slowdown, the gap decreased by only
0.4 percentage point.
Productivity Growth Differentials
and the Real Exchange Rate
Our next step is to combine the sectoral gaps of differ-
ent areas to construct the HBS measure of productivity
growth differentials.8 This measure is the appropriate
one to determine the extent to which productivity devel-
opments can explain real exchange rate fluctuations. As
noted earlier, we expect the link between the HBS mea-
sure and the real exchange rate to hold only at relatively
long horizons. Thus, our analysis focuses on the
changes over each decade.
Before assessing the link between productivity and
the exchange rate, however, we adjust the exchange rate
for very long-run movements that stem from factors
unrelated to productivity. Previous studies (Faruquee
1995; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2000, 2001) have shown
that the real exchange rate is influenced over long hori-
zons by a country’s net foreign asset position, which in
turn often reflects demographic trends. A country that
accumulates foreign assets—for example, to pay for the
retirement of its aging population—experiences a regu-
lar real appreciation of its currency. Geographical fac-
tors can also drive the trend of the real exchange rate.
Economic growth bids up the price of scarce resources,
leading to higher goods prices. A country where a fixed
resource, such as land, is relatively scarce will then
experience an increase in the price of its nontraded
goods larger than that seen in other countries—in other
words, a real appreciation of its currency.
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Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;
authors’ calculations.We capture such long-run factors by examining the
presence of any trend in the exchange rate over the three
decades in our sample. Although we find no evidence of
such a trend for the dollar-euro exchange rate, the dollar-
yen exchange rate does exhibit a tendency for the yen to
appreciate.9 This finding reflects the sizable and steady
accumulation of foreign assets by Japan over the period
and the accompanying increase in U.S. foreign liabili-
ties, related developments that can be linked to demo-
graphic factors such as the more pronounced aging of
the population in Japan.10 Furthermore, the relative
scarcity of land in Japan could also lead to a trend
appreciation of the yen. We control for these long-run
factors by removing the trend appreciation of the yen
from the dollar-yen exchange rate.11
Our analysis shows that the HBS measure accounts
for a large fraction of the “detrended” exchange rate
movements between the dollar and the yen (Chart 2, top
panel). In the 1970s, the dollar depreciated by 2.3 per-
cent annually, before appreciating moderately in the
1980s (0.6 percent) and strongly in the 1990s (1.9 per-
cent). These movements are well explained by the HBS
measure, which accounts for more than two-thirds of
the exchange rate fluctuations.
The HBS measure also performs well, though not
perfectly, in accounting for the swings of the dollar-
euro exchange rate (Chart 2, bottom panel). A fifth of
the 4.9 percent annual depreciation of the dollar in the
1970s can be attributed to the sectoral gap in Europe.
The fit is much closer over the years following the
breakdown of the Bretton-Woods System of fixed
exchange rates. The HBS measure accounts for two-
thirds of the 2.5 percent annual depreciation of the dol-
lar between 1973 and 1980. The link between the HBS
measure and the exchange rate is relatively weak in the
1980s, when the dollar depreciated slightly against the
euro although the HBS measure pointed to an apprecia-
tion. The HBS measure does a much better job of
accounting for the exchange rate in the 1990s, with
nearly two-thirds of the 1.8 percent annual appreciation
of the dollar being attributable to productivity growth
differentials.
Our finding that productivity gaps play a significant
role in driving the real exchange rate over the long run
is consistent with the results of other recent studies.12
The fraction of exchange rate fluctuations that cannot
be explained by productivity could reflect several addi-
tional factors. Although developing a more complete
framework encompassing them is beyond the scope of
this contribution, the literature points to a role for gov-
ernment spending13 and the terms of trade.14
Conclusion
Using a simple framework, we find that differences in
productivity growth in the United States and its main
trading partners account to a substantial extent for the
ten-year swings of the real dollar exchange rate over the
past thirty years. In particular, the robust productivity
gains experienced by the United States in the 1990s go
a long way toward explaining the strengthening of the
dollar against the yen and the euro.
Notes
1. For the period before 1999, we use a “synthetic” euro con-
structed as a weighted basket of the currencies of the euro area
countries.
2. See the Economist (2001).
3. Formally, RER=ER × PUS/PF, where RER and ER are the real and
nominal exchange rates, respectively (in units of foreign currency
per dollar, so an increase corresponds to an appreciation of the dollar),
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Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Bank
for International Settlements; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The dollar-yen real exchange rate is detrended. Positive values
















(1973-80)CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
4. Prohibitive transportation costs prevent consumers from taking
advantage of international differences in the price of nontraded
goods (examples are health care and haircuts).
5. The finding that productivity gains in the United States lead to
higher prices may appear puzzling. Note, however, that because the
productivity increase boosts wages by more than prices, the pur-
chasing power of U.S. workers (wages deflated by the price index)
increases.
6. See Begum (2000), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (1999), and
Chinn (1997).
7. The point is even sharper if we contrast the two halves of the
1990s. Between 1995 and 1999, productivity grew annually by
5.6 percent in the traded sector, 1.8 percentage points faster than
between 1990 and 1995. However, the gap increased by only
0.4 percentage point, from 3.2 percent in the first half of the
1990s to 3.6 percent in the second half.
8. The computation is detailed in Box 1. The weight of nontraded
goods (represented by α) in the measure is the average value-
added share of the nontraded sector between 1970 and 1999. This
equaled 0.76 for the United States, 0.70 for the euro area, and
0.71 for Japan. These shares were quite steady throughout the
sample and are consistent with the value of 0.75 considered by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).
9. The trend corresponds to a 2.8 percent annual appreciation of
the yen against the dollar.
10. Between 1970 and 1997, Japan accumulated U.S.$1.3 trillion in
foreign assets, whereas the United States accumulated U.S.$2 tril-
lion in foreign liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001).
11. Despite its simplicity, our method leads to results that are in line
with more complete estimations based on the changes in foreign
asset holdings (Faruquee 1995).
12. See, for instance, Begum (2000), De Gregorio and Wolf (1994),
and Faruquee (1995).
13. Because an increase in government spending is concentrated in
nontraded goods, it will tend to boost their price and thereby appre-
ciate the currency (Chinn 1997).
14. Favorable terms of trade make a country wealthier, boosting
consumption of all goods, including nontraded goods. This outcome
raises the price of nontraded goods and causes the real exchange
rate to appreciate.
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